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CAPTURE NUANCES IN FINANCIAL REGULATION 
Lawrence G. Baxter

 
INTRODUCTION 
In early May 2012, a select group of America’s most powerful 
bankers was ushered into a meeting with the Governor most 
responsible for bank regulation at the Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System (“Fed”).1  The bankers were there to express 
their concerns about far-reaching proposed regulations designed to 
promote financial stability and reduce their banking organizations’ 
exposure and potential for creating systemic risk.  Such meetings 
are ordinarily held in secret, but a notice and an agenda for this one 
were leaked to the media, apparently angering that most secretive 
of financial agencies.2 
Few events could more perfectly illustrate the close relationship 
between the Fed and the nation’s leading bankers.  One 
commentator concluded in advance of the meeting that the purpose 
of this “unusual pow-wow” was, in short, “to protect these banks’ 
cushy bottom lines, consequences to the overall economy be 
damned.”3  This cynical conclusion added to a popular refrain that 
the Fed has been “captured” by the industry it regulates.4 
 
  Professor of the Practice of Law, Duke Law School.  Developed from a 
paper for the Wake Forest Law Review Spring Symposium, March 30, 2012, 
entitled The Asymmetry of Administrative Law: The Lack of Public 
Participation and the Public Interest.  I am grateful to the participants in the 
symposium for their helpful comments. 
 1. The Governor was Daniel Tarullo, who has the lead role on regulatory 
policy among the Governors at the Fed. 
 2. See Donna Borak, FAQ: The Story Behind the Tarullo-CEOs Meeting on 
Stress Tests, AM. BANKER (May 1, 2012), http://www.americanbanker.com/issues 
/177_84/faq-tarullo-ceo-meeting-stress-tests-1048939-1.html. 
 3. Akshat Tewary, Big Banks Version of May Day, AM. BANKER (May 2, 
2012), http://www.americanbanker.com/bankthink/Tarullo-meeting-Federal 
-Reserve-counterparty-limit-1048954-1.html. 
 4. The claim has become very common in academic and popular literature.  
It was perhaps most elegantly put by Simon Johnson, The Quiet Coup, 
ATLANTIC, May 2009, at 46, 48–50.  For a more recent example, see, for 
example, Lawrence G. Baxter, Capture in Financial Regulation: Can We 
Channel it Toward the Common Good?, 21 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 175 
(2011); Daron Acemoglu & Simon Johnson, Who Captured the Fed?, N.Y. TIMES 
ECON. BLOG (Mar. 29, 2012), http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/03/29/who-
captured-the-fed/. 
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Yet, reality seems to have been somewhat different.  In the first 
place, the bankers were permitted to express their views, but, under 
a long-standing Fed rule, neither the Governor nor Fed staff was 
permitted to respond.  The Fed made it clear that no responses 
specific to the bankers’ views would be given and that the bankers’ 
views “were just one perspective the Fed was considering.”5  The 
bankers certainly had much to fear from the proposed rules—
enough to divert the time of their CEOs for half a day in efforts to 
dilute their regulatory impact.  Shortly before this meeting, the 
Governor conducting the meeting made a public speech6 calling for 
regulatory reform; a similar speech by the Governor of the Fed’s 
British counterpart,7 the Bank of England, had already caused 
anguish in the industry.8 
Perhaps this whole affair could be dismissed as a charade, but if 
it was, the charade was extraordinarily elaborate.  It seems that 
something much more complicated than capture is at work, even in 
big bank regulation and even within the close relationship big 
bankers undoubtedly have with their regulators.9 
 
 5. Zachary Goldfarb & Brady Dennis, Fed’s Tarullo Emerges as Banks’ 
Key Federal Foe on Regulating Risk, WASH. POST (May 18, 2012), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/feds-tarullo-emerges-as 
-banks-key-federal-foe-on-regulating-risk/2012/05/18/gIQA9MhCYU_story.html; 
see also Dan Fitzpatrick et al., Well, That Was Awkward . . .  Bank Chiefs’ 
Regulatory Concerns Met With Official Silence, WALL ST. J. (May 2, 2012), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405270230387760457738049261149889
0.html. 
 6. Daniel K. Tarullo, Member, Fed. Reserve Sys. Bd. of Governors, 
Regulatory Reform Since the Financial Crisis: Remarks to the Council on 
Foreign Relations 8 (May 2, 2012), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/tarullo20120502a.pdf 
(insisting on “rigorous implementation” of a wide suite of reforms); see also 
Donna Borak, Fed’s Tarullo: Risk of ‘Too Big to Fail’ Rises Without Dodd-Frank, 
AM. BANKER (May 2, 2012), http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/177_85 
/tarullo-dodd-frank-too-big-to-fail-1048965-1.html (reporting on similar views 
expressed by Chairman Ben Bernanke the week before). 
 7. See Sir Mervyn King, The Today Lecture 2012, BBC TODAY PROGRAMME 
(May 2, 2012), http://news.bbc.co.uk/today/hi/today/newsid_9718000 
/9718062.stm. 
 8. See, e.g., Liam Halligan, Bankers’ Vitriol has Masked Sir Mervyn King’s 
Uncomfortable Message, TELEGRAPH (May 5, 2012), http://www.telegraph.co.uk 
/finance/comment/liamhalligan/9248115/Bankers-vitriol-has-masked-Sir 
-Mervyn-Kings-uncomfortable-message.html (describing the angry reaction of 
bankers to King’s expression of regret that the Bank of England was not more 
severe on banks in the run up to the Financial Crisis of 2008 (“Crisis”)).  For the 
United States situation, see, for example, Goldfarb & Dennis, supra note 5. 
 9. This is not to say that undue influence is never at work.  Sometimes 
laxity in supervision seems to leave one with no explanation other than either 
regulatory incompetence or undue favoritism.  See, e.g., Shahien Nasiripour, US 
Regulator Under Fire for JPMorgan Oversight, FIN. TIMES (May 21, 2012), 
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/fcc68db4-9f7c-11e1-8b84-00144feabdc0.html 
 
W05_BAXTER.DOCX  (DO NOT DELETE) 10/27/2012  2:52 PM 
2012] CAPTURE NUANCES 539 
The Wake Forest Law Review, in its Spring 2012 Symposium, 
invited participants to consider, among many fascinating questions 
relating to the problems of participation in the administrative 
process, whether “the domination of industry interests necessarily 
results in agency capture?”  This Article focuses specifically on the 
capture question as it might apply to financial regulation, and in 
this context the question is quite problematic.  It will be suggested 
that in the world of financial regulation, particularly “bank” 
regulation, the concept of “capture” loses much of its analytic power 
for two principal reasons.  First, no single regulator is involved, and 
those that are engaged have different, very important missions.  
Their respective susceptibility to capture ought inevitably to vary.  
Capture of all of them by any one group of financial interests, 
however large, seems implausible.  Second, the quasi-public role of 
banks—particularly, but not only, large banks—renders the 
supposed government/private enterprise distinction, upon which the 
notion of “capture” depends,10 quite enigmatic and volatile.  As a 
result, exactly who can capture whom, and exactly what is to be 
captured, is very hard, and perhaps sometimes simply impossible, to 
discern.11 
If these are accurate descriptions of the regulatory 
environment, then “capture” is a very unsteady concept for assessing 
whether the public interest is being served in financial regulation.  
“Public participation” also becomes difficult to apply as a normative 
criterion because there are many “public participations” and many 
forums of participation. 
There are two traditional normative approaches to combating 
perceived capture by one interest group of the regulatory regime for 
all the groups.  The first, a “pro-market” approach, is to avoid or 
reduce agency involvement as much as possible, on the expectation 
that regulatory agencies can be—and, in the view of many, are 
inevitably going to be—captured by the most powerful industry 
interests.  Such an approach would increase reliance on market 
discipline on the assumption that markets are, or could be, less 
 
#axzz1vVZLSSwJ (discussing the failure by JPMorgan’s primary regulator, the 
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (“OCC”), to catch the buildup of risk 
that led to a massive trading loss on the part of the bank, and quoting one 
commentator as saying that “[t]here’s some sort of cultural and ideological 
capture at the OCC”). 
 10. See infra text accompanying notes 60–68. 
 11. Capture theory is simplistic in other respects as well.  For example, it is 
unable to differentiate between excessive industry influence, on the one hand, 
and less conspiratorial explanations of agency performance such as 
incompetence or mere lack of resources.  An additional embarrassment for 
capture theorists is the role played by many obviously independent regulators 
who have earned public recognition for standing up to both industry and other 
regulators.  See infra text accompanying notes 31–43, 131. 
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susceptible to discreet industry dominance.  The second, a “pro-
regulatory” approach, would increase rulemaking safeguards (such 
as transparency, independence from industry, and rigorous isolation 
of regulatory decisions), which are designed to prevent, or at least 
minimize, the opportunity for improper influence by particular 
groups.12  This Article builds on a view of the process of agency 
policy formation to conclude that avoidance of “capture” (or undue 
influence by one set of interests) should properly embrace both 
approaches.13 
In place of an either/or approach, we should focus on attempting 
to strike the right balance of market discipline and agency 
processes.  In order to understand the overall process, Part I of this 
Article briefly characterizes financial policy formation as the 
outcome of contests between all the participants involved, all acting 
in their own interests as “agents” in a complex adaptive system.  
Part II describes the multiple-part system of regulatory agencies 
involved in the formation of financial regulatory policy in the United 
States, a system that inevitably introduces a diversity of agency 
views and tends to inhibit the formation of a single regulatory view 
that might be captured.  Part III considers the “quasi-public" role 
played by banks, even small banks, that is usually overlooked in 
debates about agency capture, yet which greatly complicates any 
assessment of the role banks play in relation to government.  Put 
quite simply, they are not merely “private” market actors, and it is 
therefore often appropriate for them to engage very closely with 
government, sometimes even at the cost of appearing to “be in bed 
with their regulators.”  Part IV of the Article considers the ways in 
which undue sectoral influence might be averted in the process of 
policy formation and how a balanced overall result—one that takes 
 
 12. For sophisticated reviews of the various ways in which “capture” has 
been used, sometimes to further ideological ends, see, for example, Daniel 
Carpenter & David Moss, Introduction to PREVENTING CAPTURE: SPECIAL 
INTEREST INFLUENCE IN REGULATION AND HOW TO LIMIT IT (Daniel Carpenter & 
David Moss eds.) (forthcoming 2012); Stefano Pagliari, Introduction to THE 
MAKING OF GOOD FINANCIAL REGULATION: TOWARD A POLICY RESPONSE TO 
REGULATORY CAPTURE (Stefano Pagliari ed., 2012), available at 
http://www.icffr.org/assets/pdfs/June-2012/ICFR-Regulatory-Capture-Book-25 
-June---The-Making-.aspx; Jørgen Grønnegaard Christensen, Public Interest 
Regulation Reconsidered: From Capture to Credible Commitment (Jerusalem 
Papers in Regulation & Governance, Working Paper No. 19, Jul. 2010), 
available at http://regulation.upf.edu/dublin-10-papers/1J1.pdf (reviewing the 
logic of the three major theories underlying public interest regulation, namely 
public interest theory, capture theory, and credible commitment). 
 13. Cf. Christensen, supra note 12 (advocating an approach to the 
formulation of public policy that takes the notion of “public interest” seriously 
but does not assume an objective “public interest”; rather, the important 
element in the process is to ensure a “wide inclusion of both regulated and third 
party interests”). 
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into consideration the interests of all the stakeholders affected—
might realistically be promoted.  These recommendations are not 
novel, but they retain their merit at a time when debates about 
financial regulatory policy have tended to become highly adversarial 
and, in the end, unconstructive. 
I.  PUBLIC POLICY FORMATION IN THE  
CONTESTED ARENA 
As a working definition, “capture” is defined here as “the 
heavily disproportionate influence by one of the interest groups 
covered by a regulatory framework to the improper disadvantage, or 
exclusion, of other groups also intended to be embraced, restricted or 
protected by the regulatory regime.”14  Using this definition, if ever 
there were an apparent example of the appearance of massive 
industry capture of the government, the world of financial 
regulation would be it.  Yet, a complexity view of this world suggests 
an environment rather more nuanced than this “winners and losers” 
model invoked by traditional capture analysis. 
The financial market provides a prime example of a complex 
adaptive system.15  Global and domestic financial systems consist of 
a wide diversity of participants (or “agents”) all interacting with 
each other in sophisticated networks, in large part without central 
direction, and evolving in a constant state of flux.  It is equally 
applicable to the process of financial policy formation, in which 
 
 14. Of course this definition begs many questions, such as what is meant by 
“disproportionate” or “improper.”  This Article, however, proceeds upon the 
assumption that answers to these questions are inherently contested and very 
seldom clearly determined by the legislature—which is precisely why we have 
processes for reaching the outcome, delegation of details to the agencies, and 
the anticipation of ever-changing circumstances in the financial markets, which 
anticipation is embodied in the discretionary nature of the rulemaking and 
adjudication powers delegated to the regulators. 
 15. Complex adaptive systems share a number of common characteristics.  
They are not merely complicated; instead they are complex in the sense that 
they comprise a diverse variety of “agents” or actors all interacting with each 
other in a constantly evolving ecology that might or might not endure over time.  
Those that do endure have the quality of resilience or robustness, but, even if 
robust, a complex adaptive system also has the danger of developing self-
criticality or the potential for sudden collapse.  To be properly understood, the 
interactions of all the agents—in the case of financial markets, industry 
players, consumers, supporting utilities, and the regulators—must be taken 
into account through the application of a variety of disciplines ranging from 
game theory to network science.  For an introductory review of how complexity 
theory is being applied to the understanding of financial systems, see, for 
example, Lawrence G. Baxter, Betting Big: Value, Caution and Accountability 
in an Era of Large Banks and Complex Finance, 31 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 765 
(2011–12) (Part III and the references cited therein).  For a general introduction 
to the subject, see generally MELANIE MITCHELL, COMPLEXITY: A GUIDED TOUR 
(2009). 
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regulators (even legislatures and courts) are themselves agents 
interacting not only with the agents of industry, consumers, and 
other organizations but also with each other.16  In effect, public 
policy is developed in an arena of contest—through a process 
Professor Thomas McGarity has aptly described as a “blood sport.”17 
In this view, finance comprises a complex ecology.  The policies 
generated by legislatures and agents are shaped by the contesting 
forces of many diverse players.  No matter how hard and firm the 
rules erected to structure and control financial markets might be, 
the policies shaping and implementing these rules are never static.  
Instead they are dynamic, buffeted by and reacting in their 
interpretation to the actions and reactions of the agents impacted by 
them.  This is not to say that rules and agency decisions are 
ineffective; on the contrary, they are forces that themselves 
influence, with varying degrees of specificity (depending on how 
clear and simple they are), the actions of participants in the market.  
But they compete with many other forces to produce outcomes. 
An important conclusion to be drawn from this “complexity” 
view of financial regulation is that the policies resulting from this 
dynamic interaction are not linear.  They are themselves in flux and 
adaptive, for good or ill, and they are continually being shaped by a 
variety of forces.  In a suitably diverse and resilient financial 
ecology, improper influence by any one set of agents or interest 
groups would be ephemeral and perpetually subject to the dynamic 
forces of market competition, counterefforts by other interest 
groups, and contestation among agencies with differing interests 
and views of financial policy.18 
This way of looking at the process does not mean that the 
danger of improper influence, or ultimate “capture,” is not real.  
 
 16. See Mark A. Chinen, Governing Complexity, in GLOBALIZATION AND 
GOVERNANCE 55, 59–64 (Laurence Boulle ed. 2011) (discussing the application 
of complexity science to understanding public policy, and citing the leading 
works in the field); Robert Geyer, Beyond the Third Way: The Science of 
Complexity and the Politics of Choice, 5 BRIT. J. POL. & INT’L REL. 237, 243 
(2003) (outlining the characteristics of complex systems, including the rich 
interactions within them).  See generally ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. 
GLOBAL SCIENCE FORUM, REPORT ON APPLICATIONS OF COMPLEXITY SCIENCE FOR 
PUBLIC RELATIONS: NEW TOOLS FOR FINDING UNANTICIPATED CONSEQUENCES AND 
UNREALIZED OPPORTUNITIES (2009). 
 17. See generally Thomas O. McGarity, Administrative Law as a Blood 
Sport: Policy Erosion in a Highly Partisan Age, 61 DUKE L.J. 1671 (2012) 
(describing how extreme partisanship has attracted high spending on the part 
of the players/stakeholders and has attracted new stakeholders to the process).  
I would only differ from Professor McGarity in arguing that this contestation is 
inherent to the process and has only become more visible and more distasteful 
now because popular political division seems to have deepened dramatically. 
 18. In the end, the objective should be to prevent the field of contest from 
becoming so tilted that a meaningful contest cannot take place. 
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Indeed, it is likely to be the natural ambition of all the agents in the 
process.  But such a view helps us focus on the elements important 
to the continuing resilience, market efficiency, and democratic 
health of the financial system as a whole. 
II.  THE REGULATORY POLICY MATRIX 
A major factor complicating capture analysis, and perhaps even 
mitigating the dangers of capture in financial regulation, is the oft-
criticized, highly matrixed financial regulatory structure.19  America 
still has a vibrant “dual banking” system.  Although the biggest 
banks tend to be federally chartered national banks, many 
thousands of banks are still chartered by state banking agencies.  
The biggest differences in the relative powers of national and state-
chartered banks have been considerably reduced over recent 
decades, but banks do still have a real choice, and they still make 
it.20  The ability to make the choice, not only between federal and 
state charters but, until recently, between different types of federal 
charters,21 has given rise to the fear, empirically unsubstantiated,22 
 
 19. See Elizabeth F. Brown, E Pluribus Unum—Out of Many, One: Why the 
United States Needs a Single Financial Services Agency, 14 U. MIAMI BUS. L. 
REV. 1, 5–6 (2005) (describing and criticizing the complicated structure of 
financial regulation in the United States, including the involvement of well over 
115 federal and state regulators).  Numerous commentators and assessments 
have long blamed the multiplicity of regulators for the failure to anticipate the 
problems at specific institutions and the escalation of risk leading to the Crisis.  
See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-61, FINANCIAL 
REGULATION: INDUSTRY CHANGES PROMPT NEED TO RECONSIDER U.S. REGULATORY 
STRUCTURE, at abstract (2004), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items 
/d0561.pdf (describing numerous instances of disagreements among the 
financial regulatory agencies and attributing to this disagreement a failure to 
apply “consistent, comprehensive regulation”). 
 20. See, e.g., Barbara Rehm, Natural Selection?  Questioning the Future of 
The Dual Banking System, AM. BANKER (Dec. 1, 2011), 
http://www.americanbanker.com/magazine/121_12/dual-system-future-1044216 
-1.html (discussing the evolution of the dual banking system in light of recent 
regulatory reforms). 
 21. A financial institution wishing to engage in banking can choose either a 
bank charter or a savings and loan charter (“thrift” charter).  While the former 
is the more traditional form, a thrift charter has offered more attractive powers 
in some circumstances.  Banks are chartered by either a state banking 
commissioner or the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (“OCC”).  Until 
recently, savings and loan associations were chartered by either a state 
regulator or the Office of Thrift Supervision (“OTS”), a separate agency within 
the United States Treasury.  The Dodd-Frank Act eliminated the OTS and 
transferred the federal chartering powers for thrifts to the OCC.  Dodd-Frank 
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, §§ 311–313, 12 U.S.C. §§ 
5411–5413 (Supp. IV 2010). 
 22. See Dain C. Donelson & David Zaring, Requiem for a Regulator: The 
Office of Thrift Supervision’s Performance During the Financial Crisis, 89 N.C. 
L. REV. 1777, 1796–1811 (2011) (evaluating the impact of competition for 
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of a “race to the bottom,” in terms of which states and the federal 
government compete for charters by granting wider powers to banks 
or relaxing regulatory standards.  So this dual system itself can 
affect the relevance of “capture.”  On the one hand, the dual system 
could increase the possibility of capture to the extent that state-
chartered banks might be able to exercise influence over relatively 
weak state regulators, or national banks might be able to 
concentrate their influence on one federal regulator.  On the other, 
the differing constituencies and varying views of state and national 
chartering and supervisory authorities introduce a diversity of 
interests that would make it more difficult for any one sector of the 
industry to ensure that its preferences would dominate the 
regulator. 
The dual system has also given rise to conflicting interests that 
help provide balance in the contest for influence.  Most small banks, 
for example, are state chartered, and their interests are represented 
vigorously through various organizations, including the Conference 
of State Bank Supervisors23 and the Independent Community 
Bankers of America.24  In recent years, the interests of these 
organizations have clearly been at odds with those representing the 
very big banks.  These divergent interests have made a difference in 
both legislative and regulatory outcomes25 and still function as  
 
charters and finding no significant differences in returns between institutions 
that converted federal thrift charters to bank charters and vice versa).  The 
OTS was heavily criticized for being a weak regulator, perhaps even captured 
by the industry it regulated (savings and loan associations).  A number of the 
largest financial institutions (“FIs”) that collapsed or had to be bailed out 
during the Crisis, including American International Group (“AIG”), IndyMac, 
and Washington Mutual, were under OTS supervision.  Among the criticisms 
leveled at the OTS was the suggestion that lax OTS rules encouraged FIs to flip 
their charters in order to avoid more rigorous regulation and to gain the favor of 
a “captured” regulator.  Yet, as the authors show, the evidence that charter flips 
actually did produce advantages is mixed at best.  Id. 
 23. See generally CONF. ST. BANK SUPERVISORS, http://www.csbs.org/Pages 
/default.aspx (last visited Sept. 4, 2012). 
 24. See generally INDEP. COMMUNITY BANKERS AM., http://www.icba.org/ 
(last visited Sept. 4, 2012). 
 25. For example, smaller banks and their holding companies have been 
able to secure more lenient treatment in the case of certain kinds of regulation, 
such as slightly broader investment powers (trust-preferred securities), more 
lenient capital compliance requirements, enhanced systemic risk supervision 
(holding companies with consolidated assets of less than $50 billion), and 
oversight by the Consumer Financial Protection Board (“CFPB”) (banks with 
assets of less than $10 billion are not subject to direct oversight by the CFPB).  
In light of the number of other new regulations introduced by Dodd-Frank, 
whether these exemptions confer net benefits is the subject of fierce debate. 
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criteria for choosing a state charter over a federal one, or vice 
versa.26 
Of course the sheer scale of modern banks and the fact that big 
banks are now regulated almost exclusively at the federal level27 
suggest that concerns with capture and deficiencies in public 
participation ought to focus on federal financial regulation.  Yet 
even at the federal level there is a complicated regulatory 
framework that can, and often does, work to prevent, or at least 
make it very difficult for, the strongest financial sectors to exercise 
undue influence.  The Fed has emerged as the central regulator for 
large financial conglomerates, including foreign financial 
organizations operating in the United States.28  At the same time, 
the primary regulator for national banks continues to be the 
Comptroller of the Currency,29 whose Office (the “OCC”) is located 
within the Treasury Department but whose head is separately 
appointed by the President.30  And the interests of the Treasury 
 
 26. See Esther L. George, President and Chief Exec. Officer, Fed. Reserve 
Bank of Kan. City, Perspectives on 150 Years of Dual Banking, Speech to the 
Conference of State Bank Supervisors (May 22, 2012) available at 
http://www.kc.frb.org/publicat/speeches/2012-george-ga-csbs-05-22.pdf 
(explaining the resilience of the dual banking system and why it still offers real 
choices). 
 27. Although seventy-four percent of banking charters (including thrifts) 
are issued at the state level, see CONFERENCE OF STATE BANK SUPERVISORS, 2011 
ANNUAL REPORT 14 (2012), available at http://www.csbs.org/news/presentations 
/annualreports/Documents/2011FINALCSBSANNUALREPORT.pdf, nationally 
chartered banks (including thrifts) own seventy-six percent of all commercial 
banking assets in the United States.  See OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE 
CURRENCY, 2011 ANNUAL REPORT, at cover insert (2012), available at 
http://www.occ.treas.gov/publications/publications-by-type/annual-reports 
/2011AnnualReport.pdf. 
 28. The Fed has long had direct supervisory authority over state-chartered 
banks that became members of the Federal Reserve System; national banks 
were directly regulated by the Comptroller of the Currency and continue to be 
so regulated.  See infra.  Since the passage of the Bank Holding Company Act in 
1956, the Fed has also had significant supervisory jurisdiction over the holding 
companies that might own one or more national banks.  Two major elements of 
the Dodd-Frank Act have now ensured that the Fed is positioned to become the 
primary regulator for banking conglomerates.  The first is the “enhanced” 
supervisory powers conferred on the Fed, Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act §§ 115 & 165, 12 U.S.C. §§ 5325 & 5365 (Supp. IV 
2010), over bank holding companies with consolidated assets of $50 billion or 
greater, and non-bank financial organizations designated as systemically 
important financial institutions (“SIFIs”) by the Financial Stability Oversight 
Council in terms of section 113.  The second is the Collins Amendment to the 
Dodd-Frank Act in section 171, in terms of which the Fed must apply very 
important capital and leverage ratios across the holding company structure 
(prior to Dodd-Frank such ratios were applied only to the depository institution 
subsidiaries of these conglomerates). 
 29. National Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2006). 
 30. Id. § 2. 
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Department and the Fed, while often seemingly unified, are in 
reality often at odds.31  Indeed, the OCC and the larger Treasury 
Department itself are not always in mutual agreement on matters of 
financial policy and regulation.32 
Even more importantly, there is a third major regulator, the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”), with regulatory 
authority over almost all financial conglomerates that have banks or 
savings associations within their corporate combinations—and this 
means all banks of significance in the United States.33  The FDIC 
manages the deposit insurance fund and is the receiver or liquidator 
for all insured depository institutions (banks and savings 
associations)34 and potentially all systemically important financial 
institutions, even if they are not banks.35  These roles often place the 
FDIC in stark opposition to the OCC or the Fed, and sometimes 
both.  The FDIC has an interest in preventing reckless bank 
activities that might endanger depositors and the deposit insurance 
fund, whereas the OCC, for example, has an interest in promoting 
and expanding the national banking industry, just as the state 
regulators have an interest in promoting the state banking system.  
It is therefore not surprising that the OCC and the Fed, on the one 
hand, and the FDIC on the other, have clashed over what bank 
 
 31. For one of many examples, see, for example, Donna Borak, OCC Joins 
Other Agencies in Fight Against Debit Interchange Limit, AM. BANKER (Mar. 8, 
2011), http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/176_46/occ-agencies-fight-debit 
-interchg-limit-1034149-1.html (describing strong differences of opinion 
between the Fed, on the one hand, and the OCC, FDIC, and even the Fed 
Chairman, on the other, regarding the setting of debit card interchange fees). 
 32. See, e.g., Letter from George W. Madison, Gen. Counsel, Dep’t of the 
Treasury, to John Walsh, Acting Comptroller of the Currency, Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency (June 27, 2011), available at 
http://cdn.americanbanker.com/media/pdfs/TreasuryOCC_062811.pdf 
(criticizing the OCC’s proposed rulemaking relating to federal preemption of 
state consumer protection standards); see also Victoria McGrane, Treasury 
Assails OCC on Draft Rule, WALL ST. J. (June 29, 2011), http://online.wsj.com 
/article/SB10001424052702303627104576414191405604726.html. 
 33. The FDIC insures over 7000 depository institutions.  See FDIC, 2011 
ANNUAL REPORT 4 (2012), available at http://www.fdic.gov/about/strategic/report 
/2011annualreport/AR11final.pdf.  FDIC insurance covers almost eighty percent 
of all insured deposits in the United States.  Id. at 130. 
 34. Credit unions are separately insured by the National Credit Union 
Share Insurance Fund, and if they fail, the National Credit Union 
Administration acts as receiver.  While not insignificant in national financial 
policy, credit unions are not covered in the discussion in this article. 
 35. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 
204(b), 12 U.S.C. § 5384(b) (Supp. IV 2010) (noting that the FDIC is appointed 
as receiver for “covered financial companies” placed into liquidation upon a 
determination that their impending failure could pose a significant threat to the 
financial stability of the United States). 
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activities and investments should be permitted or prohibited.36  
Similarly, the Fed and the FDIC have clashed over policy governing 
bank capital requirements because the Fed and the FDIC are not 
always in agreement over where the balance between safety and 
soundness, on the one hand, and credit expansion, on the other, 
should be struck.37 
A new regulatory perspective has also been introduced as a 
result of the addition of the new Consumer Financial Protection 
Board (“CFPB”),38 which adds a consumer protection focus to the 
investor protection and financial exchanges regulation traditionally 
provided by the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”)39 and 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”).40  Together 
these agencies provide yet another center of divergent interest on 
matters of financial regulatory policy, and they, too, can and do 
differ, sometimes vehemently, on regulatory policy.41  They are 
 
 36. See, e.g., Joe Nocera, Sheila Bair’s Bank Shot, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (July 9, 
2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/10/magazine/sheila-bairs-exit 
-interview.html (describing numerous disagreements between the FDIC under 
the chairmanship of Sheila Bair and the OCC and other agencies).  One well-
publicized example was the disagreement between the FDIC and the Fed over 
whether large banks should be permitted to move their derivatives businesses 
into their insured depository institutions in order to reduce the amount of 
collateral they would need to post.  See Bob Ivry et al., BofA Said to Split 
Regulators over Moving Merrill Derivatives to Bank Unit, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 18, 
2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-10-18/bofa-said-to-split-regulators 
-over-moving-merrill-derivatives-to-bank-unit.html. 
 37. As the Crisis developed, the FDIC vigorously disagreed with the Fed 
over whether to permit banks to continue using trust-preferred securities as a 
means of raising capital.  In the end, the FDIC’s concerns were proven well 
founded.  See, e.g., Greg Gordon & Kevin G. Hall, How the Fed Let Small Banks 
Take on Too Much Debt, Then Fail, MCCLATCHY NEWSPAPERS (Dec. 22, 2010), 
http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2010/12/22/v-print/105708/fed-could-have-saved 
-many-smaller.html. 
 38. The CFPB (legislatively designated the “Bureau of Consumer Financial 
Protection”) was created by section 1011 of the Dodd-Frank Act.  See CONSUMER 
FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU, http://www.consumerfinance.gov/ (last visited Sept. 4, 
2012). 
 39. Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, § 4, 48 Stat. 
881 (1934); see U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, http://www.sec.gov 
/index.htm (last visited Sept. 4, 2012). 
 40. Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-
463, § 201, 88 Stat. 1389 (1974); see U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING 
COMMISSION, http://www.cftc.gov/index.htm (last visited Sept. 4, 2012). 
 41. See, e.g., Kevin Wack, Closed-Door Battle over Volcker Spills into Public 
View, AM. BANKER (May 21, 2012), http://www.americanbanker.com 
/issues/177_98/Gary-Gensler-Mary-Schapiro-Volcker-Rule-JPMorgan-Chase-
1049494-1.html (describing the deep differences—a “long running, closed-door 
battle”—between the CFTC, on the one hand, and the Fed, OCC, FDIC, and 
SEC, on the other, over how vigorously to enforce the Volcker Rule, which 
prohibits proprietary trading by banks).  See generally Eugene F. Maloney, 
Banks and the SEC: A Regulatory Mismatch, 25 ANN. REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 
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focused on market conduct and, as such, perform something of the 
umpireal role that would make regulatory capture a particularly 
acute concern.  The CFPB has been fiercely opposed by the banking 
industry and other credit providers42 because some in the industry 
have feared the additional regulatory burdens the new agency would 
bring.  In reality, however, it might be less the burden of new 
regulation that bankers fear and more the different center of 
interest and specialized enforcement focus that the new agency will 
represent.43 
Finally, the international layer should not be overlooked.  The 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (“BCBS”),44 the Financial 
Stability Board (“FSB”),45 and to some extent even the International 
Monetary Fund (“IMF”),46 all play a substantial role in influencing 
 
443, 454–58 (2006) (discussing numerous examples of the differences in 
philosophical outlook between the banking agencies and the SEC). 
 42. For a collection of articles reporting on the partisan positions for and 
against the CFPB, see Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection (C.F.P.B.), 
N.Y. TIMES, http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/organizations/c 
/consumer_financial_protection_bureau/index.html (last updated Aug. 10, 
2012). 
 43. Apart from a new standard by which to assess the acceptability of 
consumer financial services (whether a product or service is “unfair, deceptive 
or abusive” standard, as defined in section 1031 of the Dodd-Frank Act), most of 
the powers possessed by the CFPB were already within the scope of authority of 
other financial regulators and were simply transferred from them.  It is the 
reinvigorated focus on these powers that is probably one of the biggest reasons 
for resistance to them. 
 44. The BCBS was created in 1974 as a committee of the Bank for 
International Settlements.  It has no formal legal powers, but its influence has 
become central to modern banking, and its latest iteration of minimum bank 
capital and liquidity standards—Basel III—is one of the most important points 
of reference for modern financial regulation.  See Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision, BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, http://www.bis.org/bcbs/index.htm 
(last visited Sept. 4, 2012); see also infra note 48. 
 45. The FSB was created by the G20 nations in 2009 as a response to the 
Crisis.  It was upgraded from an earlier, rather anemic committee (the 
Financial Stability Forum) that had been formed in the wake of the Asian 
Financial Crisis of the late 1990s.  The FSB now plays a major role in shaping 
regulatory thinking on the so-called Global-Systemically Important Financial 
Banks and Financial Institutions (“G-SIFIs”), whose thinking contributes to 
and influences the way in which domestic regulators approach important 
elements of financial regulation.  On the FSB, see History, FIN. STABILITY 
BOARD, http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/about/history.htm (last visited 
Sept. 4, 2012);  see also infra note 48. 
 46. The IMF and World Bank jointly conduct a Financial Sector 
Assessment Program (“FSAP”) in terms of which the quality of financial 
regulation applied by member countries is reviewed as a peer assessment 
process.  See IMF, FACTSHEET: THE FINANCIAL SECTOR ASSESSMENT PROGRAM 
(FSAP) 1–2 (2012), available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts 
/pdf/fsap.pdf.  See generally CHRIS BRUMMER, SOFT LAW AND THE GLOBAL 
FINANCIAL SYSTEM: RULEMAKING IN THE 21ST CENTURY 157 (2011). 
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domestic regulatory policy.  Basel III47 and the new Global-
Systemically Important Financial Banks and Financial Institutions 
(“G-SIFIs”) surcharges,48 emanating from the BCBS and the FSB, 
provide important examples of policy pressure that has helped 
shape, and has been shaped by, the views of the Fed and Treasury 
Department via a mechanism that has come to be described in 
international relations theory as a transnational regulatory network 
(“TRN”).49 
This hodgepodge of regulatory structures is often criticized as 
being irrational and incomprehensive.50  There are certainly huge 
elements of the financial industry, including hedge funds and 
mutual funds among many others, that are tightly connected to the 
banking industry but are not fully covered by regulation in ways 
that would ensure against “leakage” and regulatory arbitrage.51  
However, in the opinion of this author, the call for a single federal 
banking regulator has so far been resisted for good reason.  A 
divergence of regulatory opinion is probably far more valuable as an 
assurance against major regulatory mistakes than whatever 
benefits the real or imagined coherence of a single regulator might 
bring.  And this divergence of expressions of the public interest 
through the mechanism of multiple, powerful regulators might well 
constitute an important safeguard against excessive industry 
influence. 
III.  GOVERNMENT & FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS: 
A COMPLICATED EMBRACE 
The Financial Crisis of 2008 (“Crisis”) certainly seems to have 
produced many potential illustrations of capture.  The phone logs of 
the then-President of the New York Federal Reserve Bank, Timothy 
 
 47. See generally BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BASEL III: A 
GLOBAL REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR MORE RESILIENT BANKS AND BANKING 
SYSTEMS (2011), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs189.pdf. 
 48. See generally FIN. STABILITY BD., POLICY MEASURES TO ADDRESS 
SYSTEMATICALLY IMPORTANT FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS (2011), available at 
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_111104bb.pdf. 
 49. The literature on TRNs is now extant.  For a critical assessment, see 
generally Pierre-Hugues Verdier, Transnational Regulatory Networks and 
Their Limits, 34 YALE J. INT’L L. 113 (2009). 
 50. See, e.g., supra note 19. 
 51. Perhaps most important is the vast ecology of financial institutions 
(“FIs”) that comprise the so-called “shadow banking industry.”  These are FIs 
such as hedge funds, broker-dealers, mutual funds, insurance companies (such 
as AIG), and other non-insured depository institutions that complement and 
interconnect with the traditional banking and investment industry.  See 
generally ZOLTAN POZSAR ET AL., SHADOW BANKING (2010); Steven L. Schwarz, 
Regulating Shadow Banking, 31 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 619 (2012); Erik F. 
Gerding, The Shadow Banking System and its Legal Origins (Jan. 24, 2012) 
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1990816. 
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Geithner, indicate that the captains of the financial industry talked 
regularly with him, on some occasions many times in a single day.52  
Subsequent records, disclosed under sanction of Congress or through 
Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) lawsuits, indicate that the 
Federal Reserve System had itself arranged for huge, secret loans or 
other forms of emergency funding to be made available to domestic 
and foreign financial institutions on such terms that serious 
questions of political accountability were and continue to be raised.53  
Recently, controversy has raged around whether it is appropriate 
that prominent bankers, such as Jamie Dimon of JPMorgan Chase 
& Co., should be members of the Federal Reserve banks that are 
supposed to regulate their institutions.54 
Since that time, and even long before, the revolving door 
between government and the financial industry has spun around at 
a breathtaking pace.55  The volume of comment by industry 
 
 52. See, e.g., Baxter, supra note 4, at 184–85 (citing examples); see also 
infra note 99 and accompanying text. 
 53. See, e.g., Bob Ivry et al., Secret Fed Loans Gave Banks Undisclosed 
$13B, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 27, 2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-11 
-28/secret-fed-loans-undisclosed-to-congress-gave-banks-13-billion-in 
-income.html (describing massive, low-interest loans extended by the Fed to 
domestic and foreign banking organizations to help them recover from the 
Crisis.  These loans were secret until the Fed was forced to disclose them as a 
result of court orders). 
 54. Local bankers have traditionally played a major role in the governance 
of the twelve district Federal Reserve banks, and to this day their nominees are 
Class A directors of the district banks.  Class A directors constitute one-third of 
the total board.  When JPMorgan Chase, one of the largest U.S. banks, suffered 
severe trading losses, numerous commentators and politicians were prompted 
to demand the resignation of the bank’s chief executive officer, Jamie Dimon, 
from his position as a Class A director of the New York Federal Reserve Bank.  
See Donna Borak, Dimon’s Role on N.Y. Fed Board Sparks Fierce Debate, AM. 
BANKER (May 18, 2012), http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/177_97/Jamie 
-Dimon-Chase-Fed-New-York-board-director-resign-1049463-1.html; Directors 
of Federal Reserve Banks and Branches, FED. RES. BOARD, 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/aboutthefed/directors/ (last updated July 25, 
2012); see also Peter S. Goodwin, Elizabeth Warren is Right: Jamie Dimon 
Needs to Resign from the N.Y. Fed, HUFFINGTON POST (May 14, 2012), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/peter-s-goodman/elizabeth-warren-jamie 
-dimon_b_1515220.html? (reporting on calls for, and directly calling on, Dimon’s 
resignation from his NY Fed position); Simon Johnson, Dimon and the Fed’s 
Legitimacy, N.Y. TIMES ECON. BLOG (May 24, 2012), 
http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/05/24/dimon-and-the-feds-legitimacy/; 
Simon Johnson, Jamie Dimon and the Fall of Nations, N.Y. TIMES ECON. BLOG 
(May 31, 2012), http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/05/31/jamie-dimon-and 
-the-fall-of-nations/; Simon Johnson, Jamie Dimon Should Resign from the 
Board of the New York Fed, BASELINE SCENARIO (May 21, 2012), 
http://baselinescenario.com/2012/05/21/jamie-dimon-should-resign-from-the 
-board-of-the-new-york-fed/. 
 55. See, e.g., SIMON JOHNSON & JAMES KWAK, 13 BANKERS: THE WALL 
STREET TAKEOVER AND THE NEXT FINANCIAL MELTDOWN 92–104 (2010) (citing 
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representatives during the rulemaking process implementing the 
Dodd-Frank Act56—a massive legislative reform designed to address 
the causes of the Crisis—has been disproportionate to the 
substantive input by other stakeholders in the process.57  Finally, 
the raw political power of firms and agencies participating in the 
financial industry, from individual banks and their industry 
representatives to the giant government-sponsored enterprises 
(“GSEs”) Fannie Mae and Freddy Mac, seems evident from their 
vast collective spending on lobbying, both in Congress and to the 
financial regulatory agencies.58 
With all these issues and events, the appearance of undue 
industry influence certainly seems great.  Yet, there are also many 
benign explanations for a good deal of industry influence peddling.  
The financial industry, perhaps unlike any other (with the possible 
exception of public utilities), possesses some fundamentally distinct 
characteristics that make its level of influence both inevitable and, 
to a certain degree, essential.  It is not just that the financial 
business is exceptionally complicated; this can be said of many other 
businesses too, such as pharmaceutical development and 
manufacture and deep sea oil drilling.  It is because, since the 
founding of the Republic, we have maintained an assumption that 
banking is or should be a “private” activity,59 when in fact it has 
 
many examples of what the authors call “The Wall Street-Washington 
Corridor”). 
 56. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 12 
U.S.C. § 5301 (Supp. IV 2010). 
 57. See, e.g., KIMBERLY D. KRAWIEC, DON’T SCREW JOE THE PLUMMER: THE 
SAUSAGE-MAKING OF FINANCIAL REFORM (forthcoming 2012), available at 
http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/faculty_scholarship/2445/ (showing that 
although the numerical quantity of comments by members of the general public 
has been much greater, the depth of public comment by business interests is 
much more substantive).  See generally Jason Webb Yackee & Susan Webb 
Yackee, A Bias Toward Business?  Group Influence on the U.S. Bureaucracy, 68 
J. POL. 128 (2006) (indicating that business input in the rulemaking process 
tends to be more influential than that of private citizens, particularly where 
expertise is required). 
 58.  See, e.g., Bank Lobbying on Track to Reach Record High This Year: 
Analysis, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 22, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com 
/2011/11/21/bank-lobbying-record-high_n_1106350.html (reporting on lobbying 
outlays by financial institutions in 2011 for the purpose of resisting the rules 
implementing Dodd-Frank). 
 59. The belief that government-sponsored banking is illegitimate is 
reflected in at least three major strands of development in American financial 
history: first, in the long running battle over whether to create a central bank 
and the ensuing creation of the First and Second Banks of the United States; 
second, in the repeated reversion by the states toward permitting “free 
banking,” under which numerous private banks were permitted to operate 
largely without restraint and which system was vigorously defended in the face 
of the impending creation of a national banking system; and third, in the 
curious structure of the federal reserve system, which continues to provide a 
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always been critical for central banking and monetary policy 
purposes, both of which are core to the operation of modern 
government.60  Ironically, what was perceived as a mark of 
sophistication in American banking—the dominance of “private” 
banks—has obscured the critical “public” functions banks perform.61 
Even before the creation of “central” banks, either in America or 
Britain, bankers were critically important to government funding.  
Indeed, the Bank of England was created in part with the support of 
the goldsmiths of London to fend off robbing sovereigns, while also 
enabling the sovereign to bypass Parliament when raising finance.62  
The creation of both the First and Second Banks of the United 
States, and even the subsequent establishment of a national 
banking system, was accompanied by political controversy at the 
level of the highest branches of government.63  Certainly the two 
Banks of the United States and even the seemingly “private” 
national banks were considered essential for the conduct of 
government.  The U.S. Supreme Court and various state courts 
recognized the Banks of the United States to be instrumentalities of 
government.64  National banks, chartered under the subsequent 
 
major role for private banks in the operation of central banking functions.  
There is a vast literature on these events and the accompanying, vigorous 
political debates.  See generally, e.g., DAVIS RICH DEWEY, FINANCIAL HISTORY OF 
THE UNITED STATES (2d ed. 1903) (giving history prior to the creation of the 
federal reserve system); MILTON FRIEDMAN & ANNA JACOBSEN SCHWARTZ, A 
MONETARY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES, 1857–1960 (1963) (outlining the 
development of the modern federal reserve system). 
 60. On the evolving central bank functions of the Banks of the United 
States and the national banking system, see, for example, RICHARD H. 
TIMBERLAKE, MONETARY POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES: AN INTELLECTUAL AND 
INSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 10–12 (1978) (explaining the functions of the First Bank 
of the United States); id. at 30–33 (explaining the functions of the Second Bank 
of the United States); id. at 160–164 (explaining the functions of national 
banks). 
 61. See Baxter, supra note 15, at 818–25 (describing the various “quasi-
public” functions banks perform). 
 62. See, e.g., 1 WALTER THORNBERRY, OLD AND NEW LONDON, ch. 40 (1878), 
available at http://www.british-history.ac.uk/report.aspx?compid=45058. 
 63. Of course this role has historically operated in tension with the other 
prerogatives of legislatures and sovereigns.  In Britain both Whigs and Tories 
fiercely resisted the creation of the Bank of England in 1694.  It was damned in 
the usual manner of the times as yet another dastardly idea from Holland.  Id.  
So, too, was the resistance met by the idea of a Bank of the United States.  The 
history of the veto of the Second Bank by President Andrew Jackson in 1832, in 
terms remarkably reminiscent of those uttered against the Old Lady of 
Threadneedle Street herself, is well known.  The story is once again retold in 
his biography.  See JON MEACHAM, AMERICAN LION: ANDREW JACKSON IN THE 
WHITE HOUSE 208 (2008). 
 64. See, e.g., Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. 738, 860 (1824) 
(describing the Bank of the United States as “the great instrument by which the 
fiscal operations of the government are effected”); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 
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National Currency Act of 186365 and the National Bank Act of 
1864,66 were similarly recognized to enjoy the privileges of 
government agencies.67 
This quasi-governmental function and status has continued to 
the modern day, blurring the divide between public and private—
between government and private industry—in ways that confuse 
any simple analysis of either “capture” or “public interest.”  It often 
appears as if “capture” oscillates between government and the banks 
in a mutually codependent relationship that is sometimes coercive, 
sometimes supportive. 
A. Vehicles of Government Finance 
The most visible role of banks as instrumentalities of 
government has been to provide the financial means for government 
to function.  Governments have felt a compelling need for either 
central banks or “private” banks (and, in practice, both) in order to 
fund wars or other more peaceful enterprises.  In the United States 
the national banking system itself was created for two reasons: to 
create a national system of legal tender and to provide a market and 
mechanisms for raising public finance.68  As the federal government 
found itself unable to fund itself effectively, and when the drains on 
its coffers during the Civil War proved overwhelming, a compromise 
in the form of the National Bank Act of 1864 led to the creation of a 
federal chartering system for private “national” banks.69  Thus from 
their inception, national banks had a public mission alongside their 
private banking functions.  Whereas they were restricted from the 
outset in the degree to which they could invest in and underwrite 
private debt, national banks have always been permitted, and even 
 
U.S. 316, 354, 396, 422 (1819) (referring to the Bank as a “convenient, a useful, 
and essential instrument in the prosecution of fiscal operations” and remarking 
that “[it] is as much an instrument of the government for fiscal purposes, as the 
courts are its instruments for judicial purposes”). 
 65. 12 Stat. 665, repealed by National Bank Act of 1864, 13 Stat. 99 (1864) 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.). 
 66. 13 Stat. 99 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.). 
 67. See National Bank v. Kentucky, 76 U.S. 353, 361 (1869) (calling 
national banks “the instrumentalities by which the government proposes to 
effect its lawful purposes in the States”). 
 68. See generally BRAY HAMMOND, BANKS AND POLITICS IN AMERICA FROM 
THE REVOLUTION TO THE CIVIL WAR, ch. 22 (1957) [hereinafter HAMMOND, 
BANKS]; BRAY HAMMOND, SOVEREIGNTY AND AN EMPTY PURSE (1970) [hereinafter 
HAMMOND, SOVEREIGNTY]. 
 69. See HAMMOND, BANKS, supra note 68.  The statute initially giving effect 
to this system was the National Currency Act of 1863, which created the OCC 
within the Treasury Department.  This legislation was substantially amended 
in 1864 by what came to be known as the National Bank Act, subsequently 
codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1 et seq. 
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strongly encouraged, to invest in the debt of the U.S. government, 
states, and their political subdivisions.70 
And this role has continued to escalate to the present day.  Now 
the investment and dealing in government debt is a major 
component of modern banking business; national banks and their 
affiliates within complex holding company structures deal in 
trillions of dollars of government debt.71  It is a role that has only 
escalated as modern government deficit spending itself has 
burgeoned.  In 1991 total outstanding U.S. public debt stood at 
under $4 trillion.72  This balance took nearly fifteen years to 
double.73  In 2012, six years later, it has almost doubled again, and 
outstanding debt is already nearly $16 trillion.74 
 
 70. The most important piece of financial regulation before Dodd-Frank, 
namely the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933, had established a separation of 
investment and traditional or “commercial” banking by prohibiting banks from 
investing and trading in securities on their own account.  See The Banking Act 
of 1933 §§ 16, 20, 21, 32, 12 U.S.C. §§ 24, 78, 377, 378 (2006).  Section 16 
allowed for a most important exception: U.S. Government obligations, 
obligations issued by government agencies, college and university dormitory 
bonds, and the general obligations of states and political subdivisions.  During 
the 1990s, sovereign bonds were again given special treatment in that those 
issued by OECD member countries have received zero-risk weightings—hence 
requiring no capital charge—in assessing required minimums for bank risk 
adjusted capital.  Though clearly specious in light of numerous threats of 
sovereign default, this policy certainly encourages banks to invest and deal in 
sovereign debt.  Most recently, the Volcker Rule specifically exempts U.S. 
government debt from the prohibition against proprietary trading.  See infra 
note 89; see also Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 
§ 619(d)(1)(A), 12 U.S.C. § 1851(d)(1)(A) (Supp. IV 2010) (adding § 13(d)(1)(A) to 
the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, 12 U.S.C. § 1841 (2006)). 
 71. See Baxter, supra note 15, at 818–21 (citing more detailed statistics); 
see also RICHARD BOVE, WHY DO BANKS NEED MORE CAPITAL? 16 (2012), 
available at http://www.chicagofed.org/digital_assets/others/events/2012 
/bsc/bove_051012.pdf (citing the need for banks to act as primary dealers and 
maintain liquidity in the Treasury markets as the major reason for protection of 
the big banks). 
 72. Historical Debt Outstanding-Annual 1950-1999, TREASURYDIRECT (Aug. 
18, 2008), http://www.treasurydirect.gov/govt/reports/pd/histdebt/histdebt 
_histo4.htm. 
 73. Historical Debt Outstanding-Annual 2000-2010, TREASURYDIRECT (Oct. 
1, 2010), http://www.treasurydirect.gov/govt/reports/pd/histdebt/histdebt 
_histo5.htm. 
 74. See DEP’T OF TREASURY, MONTHLY STATEMENT OF THE PUBLIC DEBT OF 
THE UNITED STATES 1 (2012), available at http://www.treasurydirect.gov/govt 
/reports/pd/mspd/2012/opds062012.pdf (reflecting an outstanding balance of 
$15.85 trillion as of June 30, 2012). 
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B. Conveyor Belts of Monetary Policy75 
Closely related to their roles as market makers and investors in 
government debt, banks—particularly national banks (which 
comprise the overwhelming portion of the banking industry by 
assets)—are instruments for applying monetary policy.  They are, as 
has famously been put, the “transmission belts” 76 by which the Fed 
enlarges or contracts the money supply and stimulates or dampens 
the economy, whether through setting overnight interbank lending 
rates or buying securities from and selling them to banks. 
It is of course true that other participants in the financial 
services industry are also engaged in these roles, but here banks are 
indeed “special.”  In any event the other participants are tightly 
interwoven with the banks, either as corporate affiliates or 
counterparties.  Like the tentacles of an octopus, banks form a 
quasi-governmental web in the ocean of public finance. 
C. Bailout Agents of the Government 
Two lesser-known “quasi-governmental” functions of banks are 
just as important as those previously described.  The first is that 
they act as blotters on behalf of the government when other banks 
fail.  The second is that they are vehicles for the emergency 
restoration of liquidity in the aftermath of a significant bank failure 
or a widespread financial crash. 
The first role is particularly true for very big banks: they are 
most needed when other very large financial institutions fail and are 
beyond the capacity of the government itself to resolve directly.  In 
such situations the government uses devices such as “purchase and 
assumption” (“P&A”) transactions so that the net public outlay is 
reduced as far as possible and disruptions to the economy are kept 
to a minimum.77 
The role of banks as bailout agents for the government is 
particularly evident in the case of big banks.  One will recall the 
absorption by JPMorgan Chase & Co. of Bear Sterns and 
Washington Mutual, the catastrophic acquisitions by Bank of 
 
 75. This imagery was used by E. Gerald Corrigan, then President of the 
Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, to illustrate an important quasi-
governmental role played by banks, and one of such roles that differentiated 
banks from other firms.  See E. Gerald Corrigan, Are Banks Special?, FED. 
RESERVE BANK MINN. (1982), http://www.minneapolisfed.org/pubs/ar 
/ar1982a.cfm. 
 76. Id. 
 77. A P&A transaction is one in which another bank acquires the assets 
(branches, etc.) of the failing bank and assumes some or all of its liabilities 
(mostly to depositors).  This saves the FDIC from having to make a net cash 
outlay to depositors.  On P&A transactions, see FDIC, RESOLUTIONS HANDBOOK, 
ch. 3 (2003), available at http://www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/reshandbook 
/ch3pas.pdf. 
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America Corp. of Countrywide and Merrill Lynch, and the snatching 
by Wells Fargo and Co. of our venerable Wachovia from the jaws of 
Citicorp at a frantic time when it was not always clear who was the 
savior and who was being saved.78 
In the process of these dramatic government-triaged 
acquisitions, the big banks of course grew much bigger.  Indeed, 
even at a time when public objections to the size of our largest banks 
had become central to the debate on financial regulatory policy, the 
Financial Stability Oversight Council (“FSOC”),79 which had been 
charged by Congress to conduct a study on whether the national 
deposit and debt caps imposed on bank mergers were adequate, 
concluded that banks should be exempted from these caps when 
acquiring other distressed banks.80  This provides both a key to the 
persistence of the “too-big-to-fail” phenomenon and an indication of 
the national criticality, for good or ill, of the nation’s system of big 
banks.81 
The second role is much more subtle, and it is by no means 
confined to large banks.  When a bank fails, and particularly when a 
series of banks fail, the economy served by that bank is placed under 
immediate distress.  Depositors do not have access to their savings, 
and employers cannot meet their payrolls.  Local and national 
 
 78. Among the many books describing these convoluted events, see 
generally ANDREW ROSS SORKIN, TOO BIG TO FAIL: THE INSIDE STORY OF HOW 
WALL STREET AND WASHINGTON FOUGHT TO SAVE THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM—AND 
THEMSELVES (2009); DAVID WESSEL, IN FED WE TRUST: BEN BERNANKE’S WAR ON 
THE GREAT PANIC (2009). 
 79. The FSOC was created by section 111 of the Dodd-Frank Act. Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 111, 12 U.S.C. § 5321 
(Supp. IV 2010). 
 80. FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, STUDY & RECOMMENDATIONS 
REGARDING CONCENTRATION LIMITS ON LARGE FINANCIAL COMPANIES 16 (2011). 
 81. In general, the banking industry is not very concentrated in the United 
States.  A recent analysis indicates that for the banking industry as a whole, 
the four largest organizations (JPMorgan Chase, Bank of America, Citicorp and 
Wells Fargo) hold a total market share of about 35%.  IBISWORLD, BANK ON IT: 
AFTER A ROLLER COASTER RIDE, GOVERNMENT AID WILL REVIVE INDUSTRY 
REVENUE 25 (2012).  Partly as a result of their critical public service as bailout 
agents, however, these banks have increased their concentration by almost 50% 
since 2008 (23% to 34.2%).  See id. at 21.  The industry is highly concentrated in 
certain areas.  For example, the five largest banking organizations in the 
United States own over 53% (in 1913 it was 6%) of all the banking assets, which 
represent 57% of nominal GDP (2.6% in 1913), provide over 60% of all 
mortgages, issue 62% of all credit cards, and control 95% of all corporate 
lending. Heather Draper, Hoenig Targets Fed, Wall Street, Big Banks in Denver 
Talk, DENVER BUS. J. (July 12, 2011), http://www.bizjournals.com/denver/news 
/2011/07/12/hoenig-targets-fed-wall-street-big.html?page=all; see also David J. 
Lynch, Banks Seen Dangerous Defying Obama’s Too-Big-To-Fail Move, 
BLOOMBERG (Apr. 16, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-04-16 
/obama-bid-to-end-too-big-to-fail-undercut-as-banks-grow.html (reporting on the 
rapid recent growth of the large banks as a proportion of economic activity). 
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economies instantly bear the impact of the failure because 
depositors and employees are not able to pay their bills or continue 
spending, and suppliers are, in turn, impacted. 
In order to minimize these impacts, other banks must step in, 
not only to act as bailout agents in the manner described above but 
also to restore liquidity to local and national markets.82  While this 
function has been well noted in the aftermath of the Crisis, as 
attempts have been made to “get banks lending again,” it is often 
assumed that such a role is confined to large banks.  Indeed, it is 
seldom remembered that the same role was considered important 
for the creation of the federal deposit insurance system in 1933.83  
And to this day the role of community banks as maintainers of 
liquidity remains important.84 
In light of these economically critical functions, it is obvious 
that banks of all kinds play a quasi-governmental role that is 
qualitatively different from that of other financial institutions85 and 
industries.86 
IV.  VEHICLES FOR PROMOTING AND SUSTAINING  
THE PUBLIC INTEREST 
The situation just described would seem at first blush to be 
starkly antidemocratic.  The lobbying power of big banks, their 
powerful access to senior regulators, and their ongoing, codependent 
 
 82. See generally Douglas W. Diamond & Philip H. Dybvig, Bank Runs, 
Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity, 24 FED. RES. BANK MINN. Q. REV. 14 (2000) 
(modeling the way in which deposit insurance offers a more efficient mechanism 
for stabilizing local liquidity than exchange markets, which lead to runs on the 
banks). 
 83. See 77 CONG. REC. 3840 (1933) (setting forth Representative Steagall’s 
explanation that the billions of dollars banks would have loaned but for the fact 
that they feared another bank run and therefore found it impossible to extend 
credit). 
 84. See, e.g., Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Fed. Reserve, Community 
Banking, Speech at the Independent Community Bankers of America National 
Convention and Techworld, Nashville, Tenn. (Mar. 14, 2012), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20120314a.htm 
(explaining the important role of community banks in their local economies). 
 85. Note that this does not mean that banks are not tightly connected with 
other financial institutions, which, indeed, underlines the dilemma of modern, 
desegregated/post-Glass-Steagall banking. 
 86. See Corrigan, supra note 75 (continuing, rightly in the author’s view, to 
hold the view that, enormous changes notwithstanding, banks are “special” 
players in the economy); see also E. Gerald Corrigan, Are Banks Special? A 
Revisitation, FED. RES. BANK MINN. (Mar. 1, 2000), 
http://www.minneapolisfed.org/publications_papers/pub_display.cfm?id=3527.  
See generally Biagio Bossone, What Makes Banks Special? A Study of Banking, 
Finance, and Economic Development (World Bank, Working Paper No. 2408, 
1999) (supporting Corrigan’s position by arguing that the banking industry is 
“special” and still distinct from its complementary nonbank financial partners). 
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relationship with government all suggest the potential for, and 
probability of, capture in the extreme.  And this is not even to take 
into consideration the enormous power of the government-sponsored 
enterprises directly charged with implementing government housing 
and education policy. 
It is therefore not surprising that the accusation of “capture” 
has been one of the most common charges leveled at banks, 
politicians representing their interests, and senior officials, 
particularly since the Crisis.87  Yet there are some mitigating 
elements, including increased publicity requirements, a raised 
public consciousness, and, perhaps least understood, the virtue of 
America’s “hodgepodge” financial regulatory system.  Furthermore, 
it is important to consider the reality that a good deal of the 
interaction between banks and the government is highly technical in 
nature and necessarily so.  This is not to excuse the lopsided nature 
of political influence that banks often enjoy, but one must address 
the different levels of interaction in order to start assessing whether 
and when the overall public interest is being smothered because 
regulators appear to be held captive by the industry. 
A. Expert v. Democratic Voices 
When two very complicated elements of the Dodd-Frank reform 
legislation were being translated into enforceable regulations, 
namely the Volcker Rule88 and the new system for exchange-traded 
derivatives,89 the level of ex parte access enjoyed by the banks 
seemed astonishing.  Numerous form comments were filed by 
ordinary members of the public in the case of the Volcker Rule far 
outnumbering the formal comments filed by the financial 
institutions that were most likely to be affected.  But the substance 
of the industry comments was far more detailed.  Logs of meetings 
between representatives of the financial industry and regulators 
appear to tell a similar story.90  In a similar vein, many of the senior 
officials involved in implementing the reforms have been drawn 
directly from the very industry that was the object of reform.  Many 
of these officials have since returned to the same industry.91 
 
 87. See Baxter, supra note 4, at 181–82. 
 88. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 619, 12 
U.S.C. § 1851 (Supp. IV 2010) (explaining the details of the Volcker Rule, which 
is the name given to section 619 of the Dodd-Frank Act, and adding a new 
section 13 to the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 that prohibits proprietary 
trading by banks and their affiliates). 
 89. The Dodd-Frank Act added extensive provisions governing the 
regulation of the derivatives business, a highly technical area of financial 
services activity.  See Dodd-Frank Act §§ 711–774. 
 90. See, e.g., KRAWIEC, supra note 57, at 29–35. 
 91. See supra text accompanying note 54. 
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Yet it seems unrealistic to expect a more “balanced” picture.  
Regulating proprietary trading (Volcker Rule) and derivatives, or 
bank capital structures,92 is an exceptionally technical matter.  
While some public interest and consumer organizations might 
possess sufficient expertise, the ability of the lay public to offer 
meaningful input is likely to be very limited.  Even financial 
journalists often struggle to understand the issues and mechanisms 
involved. 
Complicating matters still further, financial regulation involves 
the application of contested policies to these highly technical 
fundamentals.  While ex post empirical economic studies might 
sometimes validate the effectiveness of certain policies, trying to 
determine ex ante which policies should be applied, even when 
complex technical issues are well understood, is inherently a matter 
of ideology, narrative, and trope.  The long-running battles between 
Keynesians and Hayekians provide, of course, vivid examples.93  To 
this extent, financial regulation, perhaps less than other regulatory 
strategies addressing the natural environment,94 inevitably renders 
policy formulation a political process that, in turn, not only requires 
 
 92. For example, the Collins Amendment to section 171 of the Dodd-Frank 
Act extends minimum capital requirements to holding company structures.  The 
international Basel III standards add yet another complex dimension to such 
requirements.  See supra text accompanying note 47. 
 93. See generally NICHOLAS WAPSHOTT, KEYNES—HAYEK: THE CLASH THAT 
DEFINED MODERN ECONOMICS (2011) (tracing the profound consequences for, and 
differences in approach to, the role of government, including regulation, in the 
economy, and the way in which Keynesian and Hayekian macroeconomics 
defines many clashes over regulatory policy). 
 94. Environmental regulation might provide an example of more 
scientifically verifiable policy results.  When it comes to complex human system 
failures, such as financial collapses, one only has to review the great classics on 
the origins and causes of bank failures in the Great Depression to recognize 
that in financial regulation we cannot agree even when presented with a 
specific event, such as the Crash of 1929, to study.  See generally GEORGE J. 
BENSTON, THE SEPARATION OF COMMERCIAL AND INVESTMENT BANKING: THE 
GLASS-STEAGALL ACT REVISITED AND RECONSIDERED (1990); BEN S. BERNANKE, 
ESSAYS ON THE GREAT DEPRESSION (2000); MILTON FRIEDMAN & ANNA JACOBSON 
SCHWARTZ, A MONETARY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES, 1867-1960, ch. 7 (1963); 
JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE GREAT CRASH 1929 (reissue 1997).  Similar 
disagreement is to be found in the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission set up 
to examine the causes of the 2008 Crisis.  See NAT’L COMM’N ON THE CAUSES OF 
THE FIN. AND ECON. CRISIS IN THE U.S., THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT 3, 
411, 441 (2011) [hereinafter FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT] (containing a 
majority report and two dissenting reports).  In complex systems involving 
multiple human agents, any efforts to rely on linear, reductionist causal 
connections is bound to be incomplete and misleading.  See generally George F. 
R. Ellis, On the Nature of Causation in Complex Systems, 63 TRANS. ROYAL SOC. 
SOUTH AFR. 69 (2008), available at http://www.mth.uct.ac.za/%7Eellis/Top 
-down%20Ellis.pdf (exploring the multiple forms of causation operating in real 
world systems). 
W05_BAXTER.DOCX  (DO NOT DELETE) 10/27/2012  2:52 PM 
560 WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47 
effective policy participation to be highly expert but also becomes 
indeterminate in ways that encourage mutual suspicion between 
contesting participants.  It is this suspicion that can make capture 
rhetoric so pernicious because capture offers a spuriously “scientific” 
veneer to the analysis. 
So it is in the world of complex financial regulation that our 
democratic norms supporting public participation and our desire to 
be sure that “technocrats” who really understand the industry they 
are trying to regulate come into direct conflict.  This does not mean 
that public representation cannot be made independent of the 
industry, which will naturally be looking out for its interests and not 
those of a wider public, but it does mean that a substantial amount 
of technical input will be necessary.  This input is most likely to 
derive from deep knowledge of the industry, and therefore to 
emanate in practice from the industry itself.  Indeed, in the case of 
rapidly evolving modern financial markets it is hard to imagine 
where else, other than very well-funded public interest groups, 
academia, retired regulators, and members of the industry, such 
input might come from. 
B. Traditional Balancing Mechanisms 
To the extent that deep reliance on the industry is indispensible 
to meaningful financial regulation, it would seem that industry 
influence, though critical to realistic regulation, should be balanced 
by other well-informed forces in order to prevent the influence from 
becoming excessive to the point that it leads to regulatory outcomes 
that ignore or prejudice competing public considerations.  These 
balancing forces take a variety of forms, each designed to provide an 
offsetting mechanism.  Some are very traditional, some are internal 
to the regulatory process, and others are external checks and 
balances.  Some are still emerging.  Some rely on regulatory 
capability and expertise, others on objectivity, and others invoke 
processes of participation in order to bring a variety of views to bear 
in the deliberative process by which policy is decided.  All have 
received considerable attention in administrative law and will only 
be summarized here. 
1. Adequate Regulatory Capacity 
An emerging literature has drawn attention to the difficulties in 
the United States, where regulators lack the status sometimes 
enjoyed by their foreign counterparts and where regulator salaries 
do not compete with those of their expert counterparts in the 
financial markets.95  In addition, regulators are subject to the 
 
 95. See, e.g., Baxter, supra note 4, at 194–96 (discussing the importance of 
elevating the status and rewards of regulators). 
W05_BAXTER.DOCX  (DO NOT DELETE) 10/27/2012  2:52 PM 
2012] CAPTURE NUANCES 561 
sometimes-whimsical budgetary and legislative mandates of 
Congress.  It is difficult for them to match the power and resources 
of a well-funded array of industrial players, and it is difficult for 
regulators to hold on to their best performers when these 
individuals are faced with the temptations of private sector salaries 
while having to meet high living expenses.  When regulators are 
given jurisdiction, it is simply not enough to provide them with legal 
authority to act; they must also be able to discharge this legal 
authority.96 
2. Meaningful Transparency 
In financial services, regulators tend to have a penchant for 
secrecy.  Yet this opacity makes meaningful policy input difficult 
unless one has inside access—a factor that often provides the basis 
for accusations of capture.97  The Fed is particularly notorious for 
avoiding publicity concerning its accusations and has had to be 
forced, by Congress98 and through Freedom of Information Act 
lawsuits,99 to divulge key information relating to its actions during 
the Crisis.  Yet it is a truism that transparency is a prerequisite not 
only for the proper functioning of markets100 but also for the proper 
 
 96. See, e.g., JAMES R. BARTH ET AL., GUARDIANS OF FINANCE: MAKING 
REGULATORS WORK FOR US 206–13 (2012) (discussing various elements of 
regulatory capacity and vulnerability that must be addressed in order to ensure 
effective implementation of regulation). 
 97. During the Crisis, the then-Secretary of the Treasury, Henry Paulson, 
and the then-President of the New York Fed, Timothy Geithner, spoke 
repeatedly to only a few of the industry titans.  See, e.g., John Carney, Look 
Who Really Controls Tim Geithner, BUS. INSIDER (Oct 8, 2009), 
http://articles.businessinsider.com/2009-10-08/wall_street/29961329_1 
_investment-banks-financial-firms-treasury-secretary-timothy-geithner 
(reprinting an AP report, no longer available, revealing Geithner’s phone logs 
during the Crisis); Andrew Ross Sorkin, Paulson’s Call Logs, ANDREW ROSS 
SORKIN BLOG (Oct. 17, 2009), http://www.andrewrosssorkin.com/?p=88 
(reproducing Paulson’s call logs during the September 2008 meltdown). 
 98. See Monthly Report on Credit and Liquidity Programs and the Balance 
Sheet, BOARD GOVERNORS FED. RES. SYS., http://www.federalreserve.gov 
/monetarypolicy/clbs-appendix-c-201204.htm (last updated May 3, 2012) 
(describing the legislation and its application to fed disclosures).  See generally 
Nancy Watzman, Federal Reserve Forced to Report Which Banks Benefit from 
Loan Programs, SUNLIGHT FOUND. REP. GROUP (Oct. 18, 2011), 
http://reporting.sunlightfoundation.com/2011/Federal_Reserve_forced_to_say/ 
(describing the legislative and judicial actions necessary to force Fed 
disclosure). 
 99. See Bob Ivry, Revealing Fed’s Secrets Fails to Produce Harm that Banks 
Cited, BLOOMBERG (Apr 2, 2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-04 
-02/revealing-fed-s-secrets-fails-to-produce-harm-that-banks-cited.html 
(describing the FOIA lawsuits brought by Bloomberg and Fox News to force the 
Fed to release information). 
 100. Pillar 3 of Basel II, which will operate alongside Basel III, is the 
“Market Discipline” element of the international framework for financial 
 
W05_BAXTER.DOCX  (DO NOT DELETE) 10/27/2012  2:52 PM 
562 WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47 
formulation and application of public policy in regulations—as much 
in financial regulation as anywhere else.101 
3. Meaningful Access by Stakeholders   
The notice and comment model of administrative law is 
designed to facilitate access by all interested parties to the policy 
formulation process.  As has already been noted, however, access 
alone is not necessarily meaningful; the subject matter of financial 
regulation tends to be intensely specialized and beyond the abilities 
of ordinary members of the public.  Therefore meaningful access 
requires proponents of expert views, and this in turn introduces an 
additional requirement for comment on technical financial 
matters.102 
4. External Checks 
These checks on the actions of regulators and policy outcomes 
are traditional and include Congress, congressional committees,103 
the Administration (including the Office of Information and 
Regulatory Affairs (“OIRA”)), the courts, inspectors general,104 and 
 
regulation and its focus is on transparency as a means of promoting market 
discipline.  See Query for Pillar 3 Documents, BANK OF INT’L SETTLEMENTS, 
http://www.bis.org/search/?q=Pillar+3&adv=1 (documents relating to Pillar 3); 
supra note 47. 
 101. See generally Craig Holman & William Luneberg, Lobbying and 
Transparency: A Comparative Analysis of Regulatory Reform, 1 INT. GRPS. & 
ADV. 75 (2012), available at http://www.palgrave-journals.com/iga/journal/v1/n1 
/pdf/iga20124a.pdf (discussing the criticality of transparency rather than mere 
access, and making recommendations for enhancing transparency in the policy 
making process). 
 102. For further review of the devices for making access more meaningful for 
non-industry participants, see infra text accompanying notes 110–133. 
 103. Including such entities as the Government Accountability Office, which 
produces numerous reports on financial regulation and its effectiveness, and the 
U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, which recently 
produced a meticulously researched, three-volume report, PERMANENT 
SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, WALL STREET AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: 
ANATOMY OF A FINANCIAL COLLAPSE (2011), available at 
http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/subcommittees/investigations/media/senate 
-investigations-subcommittee-releases-levin-coburn-report-on-the-financial-
crisis. 
 104. The inspectors general of various financial regulatory agencies have 
produced important reports concerning regulatory failure.  See, e.g., U.S. SEC 
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., REPORT OF INVESTIGATION OF FAILURE OF THE SEC TO 
UNCOVER BERNARD MADOFF’S PONZI SCHEME (PUBLIC VERSION) (2009), available 
at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2009/oig-509.pdf; Welcome to SIGTARP, 
SIGTARP, http://www.sigtarp.gov/Pages/home.aspx (last visited Sept. 5, 2012). 
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specially created oversight committees such as the Congressional 
Oversight Panel105 and the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission.106 
Rather than cover ground much more fully explored elsewhere, 
this Article will conclude with a consideration of some recent ideas 
and developments that are intended to create or develop institutions 
designed to enhance and promote non-industry-sponsored 
considerations of the public interest. 
C. Institutional Enhancement of Public Interest Representation 
While it is true that technocratic regulation is not necessarily 
captured regulation, and that divergent, multiple regulators help 
generate the “democracy of ideas” so critical to balanced public 
policy, it is also true that all of these interests are likely to be biased 
in general toward the industry in one way or another.  In other 
words, the constant focus on the welfare of the industry, and the 
perpetual interaction with the industry at various levels, is likely to 
produce a distorted view of the overall interests of the public.  
Taxpayers, for example, and laid off employees have borne the 
biggest brunt of industry mistakes, yet those interests seldom figure 
in any strong way when financial regulators make decisions.  The 
views of taxpayers and the general public are too dispersed to 
receive adequate representation in agency decisions.  They are a 
stakeholder who is not at the table even when their interests are 
likely to be genuinely affected. 
The proposal of a public interest representative in such 
decisions would no doubt provoke angry rejection by the financial 
industry itself as yet another illegitimate intrusion by government 
into the realm of free enterprise.  In fact banking, and most of 
financial services, is not “free enterprise.”  On the contrary, it is a 
heavily subsidized industry that carries out major quasi-
governmental functions and is fully dependent on government 
business and support for its current scale of operations.  In the 
author’s view this fact has been too often ignored or insufficiently 
understood.  Without taking this reality into account, the public will 
always be short changed and the “public interest” that emerges from 
the interaction of the regulators as earlier described will not likely 
 
 105. This panel was created to oversee the deployment of the TARP funds 
committed by Congress to help remedy the economic collapse of the 2008 Crisis 
(documents now archived at http://cybercemetery.unt.edu/archive/cop 
/20110401223205/http:/www.cop.senate.gov/). 
 106. This bipartisan commission conducted hearings and researched the 
causes of the Crisis.  See generally FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 
94.  The Commission’s proceedings, documents, testimony, and report are now 
archived at http://fcic.law.stanford.edu/. 
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be sufficiently balanced to avoid the charge of “capture” by the 
public at large.107 
This would suggest the balance should be restored by 
additional, more formal representation of the public interest.  There 
are various ways such “tripartism”108 might be enhanced. 
1. Formal Public Interest Representation 
One way to intensify policy input from the “general public”—in 
other words, views not specifically represented by a discreet 
stakeholder—might be the introduction of formal mechanisms for 
promoting representation of “public interests” through institutions 
and procedural requirements.  At least three examples have been 
suggested.  One would be a mandated requirement for an 
independent third-party opinion or brief in the administrative 
process.  Elsewhere I have raised the example of the MITRE 
Corporation, which provides entirely independent, self-funding, and 
expert consulting on government decisions affecting the public 
interest yet besieged by strong commercial interests.109 
The second method of promoting an independent view of the 
public interest comes from public utility regulation110 and is 
illustrated by the recent decision of the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission (“FERC”) involving the proposed acquisition by Duke 
Energy of Progress Energy.111  The proposed merger had not yet 
satisfied the concerns of the Commission about its possible 
anticompetitive effects.112  The process for upholding public interest 
 
 107. See Baxter, supra note 15, at 825–31  (identifying the various forms of 
public subsidy enjoyed by banks). 
 108. “Tripartism” has been defined as “regulatory policy that fosters the 
participation of [public interest groups] in the regulatory process” in order to 
promote fuller participatory democracy at the level of implementation of policy.  
Ian Ayres & John Braithwaite, Tripartism: Regulatory Capture and 
Empowerment, 16 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 435, 441, 475 (1991); see also IAN AYRES 
& JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE 
DEREGULATION DEBATE, ch. 3 (1992); Baxter, supra note 4, at 191–92. 
 109. Baxter, supra note 4, at 199. 
 110. A potential model for applying tripartism in financial services 
regulation can perhaps also be found in insurance regulation, where some 
states have developed proxy advocates for advocating the public interest in 
regulatory proceedings.  See Daniel Schwarcz, Preventing Capture Through 
Consumer Empowerment Programs: Some Evidence from Insurance Regulation, 
in PREVENTING CAPTURE: SPECIAL INTEREST INFLUENCE IN REGULATION, AND HOW 
TO LIMIT IT (forthcoming 2012). 
 111. See Duke Energy Corporation and Progress Energy Inc., 137 FERC ¶ 
61,210 (2011), available at http://www.ferc.gov/EventCalendar/Files 
/20111214190732-EC11-60-001.pdf (order rejecting compliance filing). 
 112. Id. at para. 90 (applying the statutory “public interest” standard to 
reject the plans to mitigate adverse effects on competition of two energy 
companies that are seeking approval to merge).  Public utility regulation has a 
long (and controversial) history of applying public interest standards, but these 
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considerations is, as the Duke Energy decision illustrates, well 
supported by the standing of numerous collectivities, such as local 
authorities, who are properly organized to represent the general 
interests of their taxpayers.113 
A broad proposal along similar lines has been made by Ross 
Levine, who advocates for—in terms of financial services 
regulation—the creation of an agency or “Sentinel.”114  This agency 
would have power to demand information, have expertise to 
evaluate this information and the financial policies being adopted by 
the agencies, and have the responsibility to report its views to 
Congress and the executive branch.115  With purview over the whole 
financial system, the Sentinel would bring a broader perspective to 
bear than might otherwise be held by the specific agency whose 
action is under review.  Being independently funded and situated, 
the Sentinel would also be in a position to offer impartial views as 
between the various financial agencies. 
Another such broad proposal, made by Saule Omarova, is a 
“Public Interest Council” (“PIC”).116  The PIC would consist of an 
expert independent government agency appointed by Congress and 
located outside the executive branch, charged with participating in 
the regulatory process as the designated representative of “the 
public interest in preserving financial stability and minimizing 
systemic risk.”117  Like the Sentinel, the PIC would possess neither 
legislative nor executive powers; it would, however, have broad 
authority to collect information from both government agencies and 
private market participants, conduct investigations, publicize its 
findings, and advise Congress and regulators to take action “with 
respect to specific issues of public concern.”118 
The difficulty with each of these ideas is that they are 
predicated on a substantive “public interest” that can be identified 
in some detached way by experts.  Yet it is unlikely that any of the 
agents in the process would acknowledge or even perceive that their 
positions were not in fact the best ones for the public interest, and it 
is has become naïve to expect otherwise.  As one critic of the 
 
are usually reinforced by statute and assisted through well organized public 
and private representations (as was the case in the Duke Energy case). 
 113. See also Schwarcz, supra note 110, at 2. 
 114. This idea was first proposed by Ross Levine and is now incorporated 
into a book he has coauthored.  See BARTH ET AL., supra note 96, at 215–24; Ross 
Levine, The Governance of Financial Regulation: Reform Lessons from the 
Recent Crisis 2 (BIS, Working Papers No. 329, 2012). 
 115. Levine, supra note 114. 
 116. Saule T. Omarova, Bankers, Bureaucrats, and Guardians: Toward 
Tripartism in Financial Services Regulation, 37 J. CORP. L. 621, 658–59 (2012), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1924546. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. at 623–24. 
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Sentinel idea has put it, “[i]t is misleading to suggest that these 
[regulatory] judgments do not have a strong political dimension to 
them.  They cannot be put on autopilot, or entrusted to a group of 
disinterested ‘wise men.’”119  Proposing the addition of new layers to 
the regulatory process is also a questionable strategy, politically and 
financially.  The regulators tend to be underresourced as it is, and 
regulatory burden in financial services has become a rallying cry for 
the industry, sometimes with good reason.  Proposing to allocate 
even more funds to yet more external public agencies would have 
little prospect of success in today’s Congress. 
2. Private Public Interest Representation 
A third option of expert representation by independent yet well-
resourced private groups is now emerging in the field of financial 
regulation.  This is a cadre of privately funded and diverse expert 
organizations akin to the “shadow banking committee” that played a 
prominent role in critique of financial regulatory policy in the 
United States in the ‘80s and ‘90s.  The original shadow banking 
committee is now known as the Shadow Financial Regulatory 
Committee, an independent committee sponsored by the American 
Enterprise Institute.120  Additional examples are the Brookings 
Institution,121 Center for Economic Policy Research,122 
PublicCitizen,123 new deal 2.0,124 Project on Government Oversight 
(“POGO”),125 and Americans for Financial Reform.126  Similar 
institutions are developing in the United Kingdom and elsewhere.127  
Important academic centers are also providing growing and deeply 
 
 119. Howard Davies, Comments on Ross Levine’s Paper “The Governance of 
Financial Regulation: Reform Lessons from the Recent Crisis” 20 (Bank of Int’l 
Settlements, Working Paper No. 329, 2010). 
 120. The Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee is sponsored by the 
American Enterprise Institute.  Special Topic: Shadow Financial Regulatory 
Committee, AM. ENTERPRISE INST., http://www.aei.org/topic/shadow-financial 
-regulatory-committee/ (last visited Sept. 5, 2012). 
 121. BROOKINGS INST., http://www.brookings.edu/ (last visited Sept. 5, 2012). 
 122. CENTER FOR ECON. POL’Y RES., http://www.cepr.net/ (last visited Sept. 5, 
2012). 
 123. PUB. CITIZEN, http://www.citizen.org (last visited Sept. 5, 2012). 
 124. New Deal 2.0, ROOSEVELT INST., http://www.rooseveltinstitute.org/new 
-deal-20 (last visited Sept. 2012). 
 125. POGO: PROJECT ON GOV’T OVERSIGHT, http://www.pogo.org/ (last visited 
Sept. 5, 2012). 
 126. AM. FOR FIN. REFORM, http://ourfinancialsecurity.org/ (last visited Sept. 
5, 2012). 
 127. Such developments are described in a forthcoming chapter by Christine 
Farnish, chair of Consumer Focus in the United Kingdom.  See INT’L CTR. FOR 
FIN. REG., REGULATORY CAPTURE: THE OPTIMAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE 
REGULATOR AND THE REGULATED (working title, forthcoming Sept. 2012). 
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informed input to the public policy process,128 and financial 
regulators are beginning to take advantage of seemingly 
independent advisory boards.129 
Perhaps the most prominent and potentially influential 
example of independent expert public interest representation is the 
new “Systemic Risk Council,” recently formed by Sheila Bair, former 
chair of the FDIC, with support and sponsorship from the Chartered 
Financial Analyst (“CFA”) Institute and the Pew Charitable 
Trusts.130  The Council will comprise some of the leading and most 
senior former regulators,131 at least two of whom took 
extraordinarily independent lines even while in government 
office.132 
Bodies like these are independent of the industry itself and 
presumably reflect independent perspectives, accumulating 
financial expertise, and the potential for much needed expert input 
and balance on the complicated issues of financial regulation. 
 
 128. See, e.g., The Volatility Institute, NYU STERN SCH. BUS., 
http://www.stern.nyu.edu/experience-stern/about/departments-centers 
-initiatives/centers-of-research/volatility-institute/index.htm (last visited Sept. 
5, 2012); see also INET@Oxford, INST. FOR NEW ECON. THINKING, 
http://ineteconomics.org/initiatives/partnerships/oxford (last visited Sept. 5, 
2012) (bringing together in a recently established institute various disciplines, 
including complexity science, to analyze issues such as systemic risk and 
financial crises). 
 129. See, e.g., FDIC Systemic Resolution Advisory Committee, FED. DEPOSIT 
INS. CORP., http://www.fdic.gov/about/srac/index.html (last visited Sept. 5, 2012) 
(revealing a recently established committee, which has as its members some 
independent experts who have been highly critical of regulatory policy). 
 130. See Former FDIC Chair to Lead Systemic Risk Council, Monitor 
Financial Regulation, BUS. WIRE (June 6, 2012), http://www.businesswire.com 
/news/home/20120606005519/en/FDIC-Chair-Lead-Systemic-Risk-Council 
-Monitor [hereinafter Former FDIC Chair]; Sheila Bair to Lead Private 
Financial Risk Council, REUTERS (June 6, 2012), http://www.reuters.com 
/article/2012/06/06/financial-regulation-bair-idUSL1E8H66DN20120606; Sheila 
Bair: From Regulator to Watchdog, FRONTLINE (June 12, 2012), 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/business-economy-financial 
-crisis/money-power-wall-street/sheila-bair-from-regulator-to-watchdog/. 
 131. The Council will be Paul Volcker, former chairman of the Fed, and 
several former financial agency chairs.  For the full list, see Former FDIC 
Chair, supra note 130. 
 132. Sheila Bair herself exhibited fierce independence as chairman of the 
FDIC, and Brooksley Born, former chair of the CFTC, attempted herself to 
impose regulation on financial derivatives in the face of fierce industry and, 
ultimately, Congressional opposition.  See, e.g., Ryan Lizza, The Contrarian: 
Sheila Bair and the White House Financial Debate, NEW YORKER (July 6, 2009), 
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2009/07/06/090706fa_fact_lizza (providing 
a profile on Sheila Bair after her Profile in Courage award for her independent 
line on financial regulation); Brooksley Born, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org 
/wiki/Brooksley_Born (last visited Sept. 5, 2012) (providing a profile on 
Brooksley Born, also a Profile in Courage award recipient). 
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CONCLUSION 
Despite appearances, it is too facile to assert that financial 
agencies are simply “captured.”  To be sure, the great power of large 
financial institutions strongly suggests that their interests will 
receive considerable attention—perhaps even unduly special 
consideration—and that they are sometimes inappropriately 
favored.  Yet, given the nature of the financial system and its 
operations, it is hard to envisage a more active interplay than the 
one between government and big banking.  The implicit safeguard of 
the complex regulatory matrix, however, can operate as a brake on 
the inclinations of one particular agency to lean too far in the 
direction of a favored sector of the industry.  At the same time, we 
are also seeing the growing organization and capability of powerful 
private groups that are providing expert voices to the policy 
formulation process.  While it is difficult to sustain the argument for 
a single “public interest” representative, the growing number of 
organized, “public interest” oriented and independent participants 
offers the promise of an important counterbalance to the influence of 
industry. 
It is possible that the complicating considerations reviewed in 
this Article—matrixed regulation and multiple layers of regulators, 
on the one hand, and a blurred division between government and 
private market functions on the other—are entirely unique to the 
financial industry.  Yet it seems that some similarities in other 
regulated industries might also suggest that the charge of “capture” 
should often be taken with the proverbial pinch of salt, or at least 
with a healthy dose of detailed understanding of the complexities of 
the regulatory field under discussion.  Such an approach might not 
win a Nobel Prize, but it will be grounded in greater reality. 
